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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

PLAINTIFF
Walter K. Gilmore, an employee of Salt Lake Area Community
Action Program (CAP).

DEFENDANTS
Salt Lake Area Community Action Program (CAP), employer of
Walter K. Gilmore.
Hal J. Schultz, executive director of CAP and immediate
supervisor of Gilmore.
Robert E. Philbrick, elected president of the CAP board of
trustees on April 20, 1977.
Fred Geter, chairman of the personnel committee of the CAP
board of trustees.
Richard Fields, CAP personnel administrator.
Ann O'Connell, president of the CAP board of trustees at
the time of Gilmore's discharge, succeeded by Philbrick.

OTHER PERSONS MENTIONED IN FACTS
David E. Vanderburgh; director of region 3 of the Community
Services Agency.
Bernice Benns
Anita Roach
members of the CAP
Glen Larsen
'personnel committee
Janet Hanson
Gary Parara, a person hired by CAP just prior to Gilmore's
termination.
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vs.
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Defendants/Respondents.

REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT

REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS
Much of the information in Defendants1 Statement of Facts
immaterial to the issues at hand.
Specifically, pages 8 through 13 contain statements that,
whether or not true, have no bearing on the question of whether
the CAP Personnel Policies Manual was a contract and, if so,
whether the contract has been breached.
Some of the statements (such as those on pages 15 and 16),
although basically true, are somewhat misleading when read out
their context.

For instance, Defendants state on p.16:

"He

[Gilmore] never requested a written decision of the Personnel
Committee stating reasons for its decision."

That may be true

but the CAP Manual required written findings of the decision
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so there was no reason for Gilmore to request them.

The

statement as presented by Defendants is misleading.
Another example of a statement misleading out of context is
on p.16 where Defendants state:

"The decision of the [personnel]

Committee was based on the evidence presented" (citing the Geter
deposition, p.27).
exactly that.

First, the Geter deposition doesn't say

Second, and most importantly, part of the evidence

presented was presented after the last session of the so-called
hearing; this was a letter from Schultz concerning Gilmore that
Gilmore was unaware of, was not questioned about and had no
opportunity to refute.

Yet, according to committee member Roach,

the committee based its decision primarily on it.

See Facts #29

and 30 of Plaintiff/Appellant*s Brief.
No fact in Plaintiff/Appellant's Statement of Facts has been
contradicted by Defendants.

On appeal, the court must look at

the facts and all fair inferences in a light most favorable to
Gilmore, the party against whom summary judgment was entered.
Geneva Pipe Co. v. S & H Ins., 714 P.2d 648 (Utah 1986); Rose v.
Allied Development Co., 719 P.2d 83 (1986).

SUMMARY OF REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENT
POINT I.

Gilmore*s employment was not at will.

The CAP

Personnel Policies Manual did not prohibit the discharge of
Gilmore but it did limit Defendants* right to discharge him
requiring that certain procedures be followed.
A.

Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1979),
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by

recognized two exceptions to an employer's right to fire at will:
"an express or implied stipulation as to the duration of the
employment or of good consideration in addition to the services
rendered" (at 792). Bihlmaier should not be read to limit
exceptions to the at-will doctrine to only those two situations.
Other exceptions have been recognized; a company manual or
handbook should also be recognized, not as a limitation
prohibiting firings but rather as a limitation on the manner of
firing according to whatever terms may be set out in the
handbook.

Bihlmaier did not involve any company handbooks or

manuals so the question of whether handbooks or manuals would
also limit the at-will doctrine was not addressed.

(Plaintiff

submits that a good consideration requirement would be met by
Gilmore in any event; see D below and on page 14.)
B.

Utah has not rejected departures from the at-will

doctrine based on employer policies and manuals.

The cases cited

by Defendants concern situations where company handbooks or
manuals were not involved and/or where a limitation based on a
handbook or manual was not claimed, discussed or argued and,
therefore, not rejected.
C.

Gilmore does not claim that the CAP Manual

constituted a contract as to duration of employment.

The Manual

was a contract as to procedures required for termination of
employment and appeal.
D.

Even if good consideration in addition to services

to be rendered is required in Utah for departure from the at-will
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doctrine, the requirement is met.

The CAP Manual provides that

consideration.

POINT II.

Defendants did not substantially comply with CAP

Manual procedures concerning either Gilmore's discharge or the
appeal process.

In light of the number of procedures that were

violated and the manner in which they were violated, to claim
substantial compliance is to stretch the imagination.

POINT III.

The individual defendants should be held liable for

breach of contract.

Their role was active, not passive.

There

is no reason for a corporate employer to shield them.

REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENT
REPLY TO POINT I.
THE EMPLOYMENT WAS NOT A
:
;
TRADITIONAL AT-WILL RELATIONSHIP.
A. The employment relationship was not at-will and without
restrictions.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff Gilmore's employment was
terminable at-will because the duration of employment was not
specified and, under Bilhmaier v. Carson, supra, employment
remains at-will without a specification of duration.
In making this argument, Defendants (1) have failed to
recognize the difference between an employment situation with no
limitations on discharge as was involved in the Bihlmaier case
and an employment situation with some limitations (such as
procedures in a company handbook) as is involved in the Gilmore
case and (2) are advocating a limiting and narrow application of

-4-

Bihlmaier that could not be intended and is not wise.
In the Bihlmaier case, Bilhmaier had been deinied a loan
because, in response to a request for information on the loan
application, Carson, Bihlmaierfs employer, said Bihlmaier's
employment was on a trial basis and that continued employment
depended on Bihlmaier himself.

Bihlmaier considered this

statement and the refusal to change it as a constructive
discharge so he quit his job and sued Carson for breach of an
oral employment contract.

Bihlmaier offered no specific basis

for his claim that Carson had no right to fire him.

The court

said that unless there is some reason to limit the employer's
right to fire (such as an agreement as to duration of employment
or some other good consideration), the employer retains the right
to fire at will.
This is far different from Gilmore's situation.

First,

Gilmore has not said CAP had no right whatsoever to fire him, as
Bihlmaier said.

Plaintiff Gilmore is saying only that if he is

fired, the procedures in the CAP Personnel Policies Manual must
be followed and that he has a right to employment until
procedures are complied with.

The right to fire Gilmore existed

but his discharge must comply with the Manual procedures.

See

Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College, 636 P.2d 1063 (Utah
1981).

Second, in Bihlmaier, the court found no reason to limit

the at-will doctrine.

In the Gilmore case, the reason is the

Defendants' Personnel Policies Manual.

There was no manual or

handbook in the Bihlmaier case so its effect on the at-will
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doctrine was not at issue.
To say that in Utah the strict rule under Bihlmaier is that
an employer always has the right to fire employees at will unless
there is an agreement concerning duration of employment or some
good considertion in addition to services to be rendered would
foreclose refief in situations where employers have fired
classical at-will employees for most undesirable and improper
reasons.

To give Bihlmaier that strict and narrow reading, as

Defendants advocate, ignores situations not invovled in and,
therefore, neither argued or considered in the Bihlmaier case.
Surely in Utah an employer would not be permitted to fire an
employee for serving on a jury, for refusing to lie under oath
about the employer's activities, for filing a worker's
compensation claim, for refusing to participate in the employer's
illegal activities.

(These situations all led to court-

established exceptions to the at-will doctrine; see cases cited
on p.28 of Plaintiff/Appellant's Brief.)

Surely a Utah employer

would not be permitted to shield himself in such situations with
the Bihlmaier case by saying the employee was strictly at will
because no term of employment was specified and no other
consideration was rendered by the employee.

That would be the

result if Defendants' two-exceptions-only argurment is adopted.
Likewise, Defendants in the instant case should not be
permitted to promulgate a Manual with procedures for a proper
discharge, tell Gilmore he is expected to follow it, violate the
Manual when Gilmore is fired and then shield themselves with a
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limiting, and somewhat incorrect, application of the Bihlmaier
case.
In Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mighigan, 292
N.W. 2d 880 (Mich. 1980), the company had made the argurment,
made by Defendants here, that restrictions in a company handbook
could not limit the rite to fire when the duration of employment
had not been specified.

The Michigan Supreme Court specifically

rejected the lower court's finding that "a contract of indefinite
duration 'cannot be made other than terminable at will by a
provision...'" in a handbook (at 890-891).

The same argument

should be rejected in Utah as was done in Michigan.

B. The Utah appellate courts have not rejected departures from
the at-will doctrine based on an employer's policies.
Defendants claim (p.22 of their Brief) that Utah has firmly
rejected departures from the at-will doctine based on an
employer's policies.

The two cases they cite, Bruno v. Plateau

Mining Co., 73 Utah Adv. Rep. 89 (1987), and Rose v. Allied
Development Co., supra, do not support that position.
In Rose, the court recognized that exceptions to the at-will
doctrine do exist, citing Bihlmaier v. Carson, supra, as putting
forth two exceptions (where duration of employment has been
specified and where there is agreement for good consideration in
addition to services to be rendered), and then found that Rose
did not fall within either of the Bihlmaier exceptions.

However,

no written policies or procedures or employer handbooks of any
kind were involved in the Bihlmaier or Rose cases and, therefore;
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were not advocated as limitations on the employer's right to fire
at will.

Since they were not involved, argued or even discussed,

it can hardly be said they were rejected as limitations on the
right to fire at will.
The plaintiff in Rose based his claimed employment contract
on nothing more than two very brief oral conversations ("five
minutes" and "a few sentences") with the defendant during which
the minds obviously never met on the terms Rose claimed.
In the recent Bruno case, written policies were involved but
the plaintiff was not basing his claimed wrongful discharge on
those written policies.

In an interesting twist, he was trying

to base his claim on what he said was a non-written practice
directly opposite to the written policy.

The defendant company

had a written policy giving it the option to fire employees for
fighting and plaintiff was indeed fired for fighting.

Bruno said

his discharge was wrongful because, despite that written policy,
the company had an actual practice or de facto policy of not
firing for fighting; Bruno claimed the practice was an implied
contractural promise.

The court ruled that even if such a de

facto practice existed, "this practice alone is not enough to
establish Plateau's intentional surrender of its right to
terminate Bruno's employment at will."
Applying this reasoning to the Gilmore case, one would ask:
Did Defendants do something "to establish their intentional
surrender of the right to terminate Gilmore's employment
at-will?"

The answer is yes: they promulgated a Personnel

Policies Manual.

They did not surrender the right to discharge

Gilmore but they did surrender the right to discharge him unless
the procedures in the Manual were complied with.
The court in Bruno found a Bihlmaier exception had not been
established and rejected an attempt to create an exception based
on an unwritten de facto practice.

Plaintiff Gilmore is not

trying to establish a Bilhmaier exception or trying to establish
a Bruno-type exception.

Gilmore is trying to establish a

limitation based on the written Manual.

Such an exception was

not addressed or considered in either Bihlmaier or Bruno.
The court in Bruno further wrote: "An implied contract
altering the employment-at-will relationship, like other
contracts implied in fact, would require actions or conduct
manifesting the mutual assent of both parties to be bound by the
certain terms of their bargain" (at 90-91).

Again applying this

language to Gilmore, we find the promulgation of the Manual and
the acceptance of it as evidence of mutual consent to be bound by
the terms of the Manual.

Gilmore was not free to accept or

reject portions of the Manual he chose.

The same standard must

be mutually applied the the Defendants.
Defendants attempt to get around Forrester v ; Parker, 606
p.2d 191 (N.M. 1980), a case directly and completley on point
with the Gilmore case.

Forrester, they accurately point out,

required defendants (Parker and the local CAP) to conform to
procedures for terminating Forrester as spelled out in the CAP
manual because the manual created an implied contract and bound
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the parties.

But Defendants here argue that Rose rejected this

departure from the at-will doctrine, holding that "'the existence
of an employment agreement not terminable at-will must be
established by more than subjective understandings or
expectations'" (p.25 of their Brief).

Forrester did not try and

Gilmore is not trying to create departures from the at-will
doctrine based on "subjective understandings or expectations."
Forrester relied on and Gilmore is relying on a on detailed,
written policy manual, something missing in Rose.
Defendants cite Valentine v. General American Credit Inc.,
362 N.W.2d 628 (Mich. 1984), as (1) a clarification of the
leading case in the field, Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield
of Michigan, supra, and (2) a rejection of "Gilmore*s argument
that a personnel policy manual creates a new employment right"
(pp. 25, 26 of their Brief).

To that we respond: Valentine

specifically reaffirms the Toussaint holding that company manuals
may be enforceable in contract.

The case does point out that

Touissaint did not "recognize employment as a fundamental right
or create a new
was trying to do.

'special' right," as the plaintiff in Valentine
But Gilmore has never claimed that he has a

fundamental right to employment or that he has some "special"
right to his job.

His only claim is a right to be terminated

properly in accordance with the procedures in the CAP Manual.

He

seeks to enforce the Personnel Policies Manual as a contract, a
right recognized in Toussaint and reaffirmed in Valentine.
Defendants claim (p.26 of their Brief) that a majority of
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the states which have considered the question have determined
that a policy manual does not implicitly limit the right of an
employer to terminate at will.

In the cases cited, a look at the

reasons for the rejection of company policies as a limitation in
those cases shows them to be inapplicable to the instant case.
For instance:
* Reid v. Sears, Roebuck and Co.,

790 F.2d 453 (6th Cir.

1986): Plaintiffs claimed they were wrongfully discharged because
the employee handbook's listing of causes that could result in
termination limited the company's right to fire.

The court

pointed out that an employer can defeat such claims by requiring
prospective employees to acknowledge that they serve as at-will
employees.

Sears had included that exact language in its

employment application, indicating clearly that the employee
handbook was not to be a contract.

No such language is involved

in the Gilmore case; hence, Reid is inapplicable.
*Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d
779 (1976): The court here refused to construe the employee
handbook as a contract because it was a "unilateral expression of
company policy and procedures" and was "not published until long
after plaintiff's employment." Neither description is applicable
in the Gilmore case.
Schroeder v. Dayton-Hundson Corp., 448 F.Supp. 910 (E.D.
Mich. 1977): The court looked at the employee handbook as
something designed to inform the employee about fringe benefits,
privileges and certain policies.
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The significant factor to

consider here, however, is that this was a federal district court
applying Michigan law to state common law claims prior to the
time the Michigan Supreme Court decided Toussaint.
Heideck v. Kent General Hospital Inc., 446 A.2d 1095 (Del.
1982): The court described the handbook here as a "unilateral
expression" that was "issued for guidance...of employees."

The

court also noted that the handbook had been complied with.
Defendants have ignored the trend and the long line of cases
recognizing company handbooks and manuals and contractually
enforceable.

In addition to cases already cited in

Plaintiff/Appellant's Brief, handbooks and manuals have been
found enforceable as contracts in:
Mobil Coal Producing Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702 (Wyo.
1985); Leithead v. American Colloid Co., 721 P.2d 1059 (Wyo,
1986); Continental Air Lines Inc. v. Keenan, 731 P.2d 708 (Colo.
1987); Alexander v. Phillips Oil Co., 707 P.2d 1385 (Wyo. 1985).

C. No claim is made that the CAP Manual constituted a contract
as to duration of employment.
Defendants argue (p. 26 of their Brief) that under Utah lav;
an employer's policies do not constitute an express or implied
contract as to the duration of employment.

Plaintiff Gilmore has

not argued that the CAP Manual was a contract concerning duration
of employment.

Gilmore has not argued that the Manual gave him a

right to lifetime employment or to employment for a specified
length of time.

He argues that the Manual gave him a right to be

terminated properly, in accordance with procedures spelled out in
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the CAP Manual.
Defendants misleadingly state that Gilmore "was employed six
months before he obtained a copy of the policies" (p.27),

a

fact

that may or may not be true but in either case is immaterial.
Plaintiff Gilmore was originally hired on a temporary basis and
worked on that basis for six months.

So whether he had a copy of

the Manual during that period is not material as the policies did
not necessarily apply to him in the termporary position (or at
least, that question is not at issue here).

But at the time

Plaintiff Gilmore became a permanent employee, he had a copy and
was told he was expected to follow the policies laid out in the
Manual.
Defendants then argue that Moore v. Utah Technical College,
727 P.2d 634 (Utah 1986), and Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State
College, supra, are cases that fall within the Bihlmaier
exception (concerning length of employment) to the at-will
doctrine because both cases involve one-year contracts of
employment.

Defendants describe the cases as "excellent examples

of the employment at-will doctrine, demonstrating the
circumstances under which the first exception to the doctrine
applies" (p.29 of their Brief).

Such a statement actually

indicates a lack of understanding of both the Bihlmaier exception
and the two cases.
^

e

Bihlmaier exception concerning duration of employment

involves the situation where an employee has a contract or
agreement (express or implied) to work for a certain period of
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time.

If the employee is fired during that period, he would have

a cause of action for being wrongfully terminated as the contract
prevents his being fired during the time specified.

In Moore and

Piacitelli, a series of one-year contract periods had expired.
The employers decided not to continue the employment of Moore and
Piacitelli and so notified them.

The question in both cases was

not whether the employees (Moore and Piacitelli) had been
terminated wrongfully during the period of employment specified
in the contracts.

Rather the question was whether they had been

properly terminated in accordance with procedures detailed in the
employer policy manuals.

In both cases, the employers were

required to comply with the manual procedures.

If anything, a

requirement of compliance with the CAP Manual should be stronger
in the Gilmore case.

In Moore and Piacitelli, the duration of

employment had ended under the terms of the contract but
compliance with handbook procedures was still mandated.
It is correct, as Defendants point out on p.29 of their
Brief and as is pointed out on p.24 of Plaintiff/Appellant's
Brief, that the Utah Supreme Court was not asked in Piacitelli to
actually decide whether the personnel manual was a contract as
that question had been decided in the affirmative by the Fifth
District Court and was not appealed.

But in its opinion, the

court noted such and referred to the lower court's ruling with
approval.

(Piacitelli at 1065-1066.)
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D. The CAP Manual was good consideration in addition to services
to be rendered.
""
Defendants argue (p.29 of their Brief) that Gilmore did not
provide any good consideration in addition to the services to be
rendered and, therefore, the second Bihlmaier-recognized
exception to the at-will doctrine cannot be found.

Even if the

court were to rule that the two Bihlmaier exceptions to the
at-will doctrine are the only exceptions that will be recognized
in Utah, Plaintiff Gilmore's discharge is still improper on the
grounds that the second Bihlmaier exception is present.

The

"express or implied ...good consideration in addition to the
services contracted to be rendered" (Bihlmaier at 792) is
provided by the CAP Personnel Policies Manual.
In Leithead v. American Colloid, supra, the lower court had
held that the company handbook was not part of the employee's
contract because it was "not supported by consideration running
from appellant [employee] to the company.

The Wyoming Supreme

Court rejected this "rule of additional consideration relied on
by the district court," ruling:
The benefits extended to the employee in
the handbook are enforceable contract terms,
because they are supported by consideration
flowing to the employer. That consideration
consists of the benefit of an orderly,
cooperative and loyal work force. (At 1063
and citing Mobil Coal Producing Inc. v.
Parks, supra.)
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In the Mobil case, the court had written:
The handbook *s provisions change the
appellant's [company's] unfettered right to
discharge appellee [employee]...provisions
[in the handbook] create an expectation on
the part of an employee that they will be
followed, and they induce appellee to
continue his employment with appellant.
Appellant 'secures an orderly, coopertive and
loyal work force'...Benefit to the promisor
is sufficient consideration for a contract.
(At 707.)
The source of this reasoning was the Michigan Supreme Court,
which had said in Toussaint:
While an employer need not establish
personnel policies or practices, where an
employer chooses to establish such policies
and practices and makes them known to its
employees, the employment relationship is
presumably enhanced. The employer secures an
orderly, cooperative and loyal work force,
and the employee the peace of mind associated
with job security and the conviction that he
will be treated fairly. No pre-employment
negotiations need take place and the parties'
minds need not meet on the subject; nor does
it matter that the employee knew nothing of
the particulars of the employer's policies
and practices or that the employer may change
them unilaterally. It is enough that the
employer chooses, presumably in its own
interest, to create an environment in whcih
the employee believes that, whatever the
personnel policies and practices, they are
established and official at any given time,
purport to be fair, and are applied
consistently and uniformly to each employee.
The employer has then created a situtation
"instinct with an obligation." (At 892;
footnotes omitted.)
In light of the foregoing, the court should find that if the
Bihlmaier case requires good consideration in order to depart
from the at-will doctrine, then that requirement is satisfied by
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a written policy manual promlgated by the employer and relied on
by the employee.

REPLY TO POINT II,

DEFENDANTS DID NOT SUBSTANTIALY COMPLY
WITH THE CAP PERSONNEL POLICIES MANUAL.

A. Defendants did not substantially compny with the CAP
Personnel Policies Manual in discharging Gilmore.
Defendants' argument (Point II, p.31, of their Brief) that
CAP substantially complied with the Personnel Policies Manual is
simply not born out by the uncontested facts.

In Plaintiff/

Appellant's Brief, all violations of the CAP Manual are
delineated in the Statement of Facts, specifically Facts #17
through 22, 26, 31, 32, 35, 39, 40, 42, 43.

None of these facts

have been denied by Defendants.
Defendants ignore the investigation by the Community
Services Administration, a grantor agency of CAP, which
determined that CAP had violated the CAP Personnel Policies
Manual and then sanctioned CAP with a cut in funds (all of which
is uncontested by Defendants).

Apparently CSA saw no

"substantial compliance."
Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College, supra, approves
of substantial compliance only where the purposes of the
procedural requirements are fulfilled and the substantial
interests of the parties are satisfied (at 1066).

In Piacitelli,

the College's handbook contained considerable detail about the
purposes of various procedures (at 1066) and the court looked at
those stated purposes in determining whether the actions taken by
the employer were in substantial compliance.
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The CAP Personnel

Policies Manual, however, is largely silent as to the purposes of
its various procedural requirements.

Defendants have taken it

upon themselves to speculate on what the purposes of the
uncomplied-with procedures might be and then conclude that the
purposes they have supplied have been met.

Such speculative

additions after the fact should not be permitted.
Defendants also try to show substantial compliance by simply
talking in circles.

Defendants spend three pages (pp.33, 34, 38)

expounding on discussions Defendant Schultz had with Plaintiff
Gilmore about alleged problems with his (Gilmore's) work
performance, then point out that Gilmore was reduced in force,
not discharged for poor job performance.

Even assuming that such

discussions took place as Defendants claim, it makes no sense to
say that discussions about his job performance were supposed to
give Gilmore some idea that he would be reduced in force.

Taking

into consideration his periodic raises in pay and the one job
evaluation, which although never completed, gave Gilmore
excellant and above average ratings, Gilmore certainly had no
reason to believe he was about to be discharged, either because
of a reduction in force or for poor job performance.
Nor was the Manual's requirement of periodic job performance
evaluations ever substantially complied with in any manner that
could possibly put Gilmore on notice that his job was in
jeopardy.

The one uncompleted evaluation did just the opposite.
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B. Defendants did not substantially comply with the CAP
Personnel Policies Manual in hearing Gilmore's appeal.
Defendants state (p.39 of their Brief) that CAP's appeal
procedure was adopted to provide for prompt and fair consideration of personnel actions.

Again Defendants have speculated on

a purpose where none is stated in the Manaul.

But even if that

is accepted as the purpose, the manner of handling Gilmore's
appeal cannot be described with the terms prompt and fair.
The Manual entitled Gilmore to an appeal before Schultz.
Schultz claimed a meeting he had with Gilmore before the firing
was an appeal of the firing.

It can hardly be said that Schultz

substantially complied with the Manual by calling a meeting held
before the firing an appeal hearing on the firing.

[Note:

Defendants state on p.44 that within four or five days after
Schultz notified Gilmore of the decision to teminate him, Gilmore
was afforded a full hearing.

This simply is not true, as

evidenced by uncontested facts.

Schultz in his March 16 letter

to Gilmore (Exhibit D-13 to the Gilmore depositon and Addendum-4
of Plaintiff/Appellant*s Brief) said he considered a meeting he
had with Gilmore the previous week to be an appeal of the March
14 termination.

Neither Plaintiff nor Defendants have ever, in

the lower court or in the statements of facts on appeal, stated
that Schultz afforded Gilmore a full hearing before him after the
firing.]
The appeal hearing before the CAP personnel committee was
full of flaws:

only two of five committee members present at the
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first session of the so-called hearing and only three of five
members present at the second session; no opportunity for Gilmore
to know and refute what Schultz told the committee members, a
decision based primarily on information in a letter unknown to
Gilmore and given to the committee after the conclusion of the
hearing, a decision issued three weeks after the hearing and not
within five days as required, no written findings.

(These flaws

are detailed in Facts #20 through 35 of Plaintiff/Appellant *s
Brief.)

It stretches the imagination to describe the Defendants'

actions concerning the appeal process as "substantially in
compliance."
Defendants argue (p.39 of their Brief) that "Gilmore
believes he was not afforded a fair hearing because it was not a
trial type or formal hearing."

Gilmore has made no such claim.

He has merely asked that the hearing and appeal process be fair
and comply with the Manual rules.
The cases Defendants cite on pp.39 and 40 of their Brief are
civil rights cases and a case involving a license revocation
hearing.

Those cases did not involve any company policy manuals.

Their holdings in the due process area have limited application
to company policy manual cases where enforcement is not sought on
civil rights grounds.
Defendants state (p.42 of their Brief) that "Gilmore never
requested the formal procedures he now claims should have been
provided."

First, Gilmore claims only that the procedures

required by the Manual must be followed.

Second, a reading of

the pages of Gilmore's deposition referred to by Defendants (on
pp.42 and 43 of their Brief) shows that Gilmore never waived any
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rights.

His testimony shows only that he never had an

opportunity to request what Defendants now claim he waived.
REPLY TO POINT III.
THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS ARE
LIABLE FOR THEIR BREACH OF CONTRACT.
Defendants argue (Point III, p.45) that summary judgment
dismissing claims against CAP officers and employees (Schultz,
Geter, Fields, Philbrick, O'Connell) is proper because these
individual defendants are not personally liable for a breach of
contract with Plaintiff Gilmore.
Moniodis v. Cook, 494 A.2d 212 (Md.App. 1985), directly
addressed the question of whether an officer or employee of a
corporation can be sued individually and held liable for the
wrongful discharge of an employee. The court ruled:
This is not to say that an "officer of a
corporation or other business entity who
plays a dominant role in the affairs of the
corporate employer and who primarily
formulates the corporation's decision to fire
a particular employee or group of employees
should be permitted to take refuge behind the
corporate veil in order to insulate himself
from liability for his own wrongful conduct. (At 218.)
Applying that criteria to the defendants in that case, the
court found no individual liability because those defendants had
played no key roles, had many officers senior to them with veto
power over their actions, had little or no policy-making
authority.
The situation is far different in the Gilmore case and
applying the Moniodis criteria would lead to a finding of
personal liability.

Schultz was the executive director with

responsibility for day-to-day operations and authority for all
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personnel decisions, including initial appeals of his personnel
decisions.

Richard Fields was the personnel administrator, whose

duties included, among others, seeing that employee evaluations
were done in accordance with the CAP Personnel Policies Manual
(see Manual).

Fred Geter was chairman of the personnel commitee,

which was responsible for hearing appeals in accordance with CAP
personnel policies (see Manual).

Robert Philbrick and Ann

O'Connell were presidents of the CAP board of trustees, both of
whom Gilmore complained to concerning the lack of adherence to
the Manual procedures and neither of whom took any action to
correct the situation.
The court in Moniodis also pointed out that its previous
decisions had not been intended to provide a cause of action for
wrongful discharge against corporate officials, "at least where
the evidence does not show that the officer was clothed with the
essential attributes of an employer" (at 218). Certainly the
individual defendants in the Gilmore case were well clothed with
the "essential attributes of an employer" and should not ask the
corporation to shield them from their own personal actions.
One of two cases Defendants cite (on p.45 of their Brief) to
support their contention that the individual Defendants should
not be personally liable, Golden v. Anderson, 256 Cal.App.2d 714,
64 Cal.Rptr. 404 (1967), actually holds the opposite, reaching
the conclusion that corporate officials, not only the
corporation, may be held personally liable.

Mr. Golden had sued

four corporate defendants and nine employees as individuals for
intentional interference with a contract; as to three of the
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individual defendants, the court ruled that even though they had
acted for the corporation in a representative capacity and within
the course and scope of their employment, they were not immune
from liability as individuals.

The lower court's summary

judgment in their favor was reversed.

Summary judgment was

upheld in favor of six other individual defendants but only
because the facts showed that they had absolutely no knowledge of
any contract and, therefore, could not have done anything to
interfere.

Similar to Moniodis, the question turned on whether

the individuals were active participants.

And an application of

that reasoning to the instant case would preclude summary
judgment against the individual defendants, all of whom were
active participants.
The other case Defendants cite in support of their
contention, Wise v. Southern Pacific Co.,223 Cal.App.2d 50,
35 Cal.Rptr. 659 (1953), concerned a suit against fellow
employees for conspiracy to obtain the plaintiff's discharge. The
court's holding that employees of a corporation cannot be found
to have conspired with the corporation has no applicability in
the Gilmore case.

Plaintiff Gilmore does not seek liability

based on conspiracy.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff Gilmore has replied to each argument Defendants
have made in support of the lower court's summary judgment in
their favor and has demonstrated why such agruments are incorrect
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or inapplicable and should be rejected.

It should also be noted

that Defendants made no response to the estoppel argument made by
Plaintiff Gilmore in Point II of the Plaintiff/Appellant•s Brief.
In this light and in light of all materials before the
court, Plaintiff Gilmore respectfully submits that he should be
granted the relief sought as stated in his Brief together with an
award of his costs, pursuant to Rule 34, R. Utah Ct. App.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on April 12, 1988:

Nann N o v i n s k i - D u r a n d o
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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